Why is Latin America the World's Most Violent Region?
An apparently simple question, calling for complex answers. By Prof. Nicolas Forsans
Latin America is home to some of the world's most beautiful landscapes and vibrant cultures, but it also carries the unfortunate title of being the most violent region on Earth. With only 8% of the global population, the region accounts for a staggering one-third of the world’s homicides. But why? What drives the unprecedented levels of violence that ravage countries from the Caribbean to the Southern Cone? This post digs into the complex web of factors—historical, economic, social, and political—that fuel the violence in Latin America, challenging the simple answers and uncovering the deeply rooted causes that continue to plague the region today.
It is simple question. yet the answer is incredibly complex.
Key facts about violence in Latin America
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the homicide rate is three times higher than the global average (18 versus 5.6 per 100,000 inhabitants) and 50 percent of homicides are associated with organised crime, compared to 24% in the rest of the world. LAC is the only region where homicide is the main cause of death (accounting for 52 percent) —in the rest of the world, diseases and accidents top the list. In Latin America, people kill each other.
Unsurprisingly, the region is home to 8 out of the 10 most violent countries in the world. About 40 of the 50 most dangerous cities are located in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Concerns about crime has increased since the pandemic, with regional surveys revealing the prevalence of crime and insecurity as the main challenge facing their country.
Some countries are more violent than others
There is a wide disparity in homicide data in the region.
While several Caribbean countries witness homicide rates in excess of 30 per 100,000 in 2023, other countries such as including Chile and Peru have rates under 10 per 100,000, even if both countries have recently witnessed an uptick in homicides.
Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, which together host around 60 percent of the region’s population, account for 70 percent of the region’s homicides.
While the median homicide rate in the region has been generally stable over the past decade, there have been important variations over time, in some countries (see Figure 1 above, in particular panel 2).
Colombia experienced significant improvements, especially in Cali and Medellin —cities once known as epicentres of organised crime. El Salvador witnessed the sharpest decline in homicides in the region, following the intensification of security operations by the government of President Bukele against gangs and stronger cooperation between the judiciary and the police to fight narco- and gun-trafficking. Meanwhile, Ecuador has been experiencing an unprecedented escalation in lethal violence, owing largely to competition between drug trafficking groups— we wrote about Ecuador’s deteriorating security situation here.
Migration and gangs spreading across borders are also contributing to concerns in the region. Gangs spreading from Venezuela have been related to an increase in kidnappings in Chile, and homicides and sexual assault against Venezuelan migrants drove the rise in crime rates in Colombia near the border. These recent experiences are generating a debate on how states should respond to violent crime - see this in the case of Honduras, and our recent post on the effectiveness of states of exception:
Socio-economic and other drivers of violence in Latin America
It is a complex phenomenon, which involves a diversity of crimes and in which many risk factors converge, some of which are structural in the region, such as the lack of socioeconomic opportunities, institutional weaknesses, even individual or community factors such as living in violence. All of these are factors that have been identified as favouring organised crime.
Poverty and inequalities drive criminality
The World Bank had shown a strong link between demographics, economic and social development and criminality: poverty fuels criminality. Studies show that a 1 percentage point increase in the growth rate of GDP is related to roughly 0.24 fewer homicides per 100,000 (all else equal, including income per capita). But for gains to be sustainable, the strength and credibility of judicial systems and law enforcement institutions must improve in tandem with economic development.
Other researchers have shown that economic and labour market shocks provide incentives to partake in criminality. Job opportunities play a key role as a driver of the opportunity cost of engaging in crime, with researchers showing that weaker manufacturing job prospects in caused by competition with China has spurred violence in Mexico.
We also know inequalities fuel crime in the region, and that urbanisation plays a part too. Social and spatial divides in cities or regions can deepen inequality and create fertile ground for organised crime groups, street gangs, and private security entities substituting the role of the state. Violence is highest in poor urban neighbourhoods and on the outskirts of cities where 160 million people (about 25 percent of the urban population) lives in low-income informal settlements lacking title and access to basic services. About 50 percent of crime across all crime types occur in just 2.5 percent of the street space in Latin America and the Caribbean. The IDB argues these dynamics favour the concentration of “pockets of fragility”—cities or territories where populations are subject to extremely weak state capacity and/or different criminal forms of governance and service provision.
Demography and criminality
Finally, demography also matters: in the region, young males aged 15 to 29 accounted for 47 percent of suspects brought into formal contact with the criminal justice system for intentional homicide in 2021, according to the United Nations. Crime and violence also worsen gender inequalities in labour markets, with women facing significant barriers to employment, often reducing their workforce participation due to fear of victimisation or intimate partner violence.
Criminality and violence in Latin America are rooted in (mostly) five factors, some of which are deeply embedded in the social fabric of Latin American countries. Let’s focus on each one in turn.
Identifying the roots of the violence in Latin America
Violent crime and insecurity in LAC stem from a constellation of domestic and external factors.
The region has a long history of political violence, civil wars, past authoritarian rule, and pervasive corruption, all of which have undermined the rule of law and hampered economic and social development in the region.
In a report released this week, the IMF notes that ever since colonial times, “different layers of violence”—political violence, civil wars, organised crime, state violence, targeted violence against specific socioeconomic groups such as indigenous, LGBTQ+ communities, women—have “intersected and mutually intensified”. These layers have produced mass killings, targeted assassinations, forced disappearances, and human rights abuses.
“When state institutions do not adequately protect citizens, guard against corruption, or provide access to justice; when markets do not provide job opportunities; or when communities have lost social cohesion-the likelihood of violent conflict increases”
The World Bank, World Development Report, 2011
Structural factors such as extractive- and commodity-dependent economies, weak state institutions, corruption in the police and the judiciary but also in governments, poverty and inequalities (of income, but also of opportunities, for example as a result of discriminations), unresolved social problems, or the geopolitical landscape have facilitated the emergence of these layers.
At the same time, violence has contributed to perpetuating some of these structural factors.
1. Organised crime and drug trafficking
Clearly, this is one of the main contributors of crime and violence in the region —as we’ve seen in Ecuador in recent years.
Drug trafficking plays a key role, with Colombia, Peru and Bolivia the world’s top three coca cultivation countries, and routes running through Central America and Mexico towards the United States and increasingly Europe. Drug trafficking, and transnational crime organisations that make it happen, exacerbate gang violence (see, for example, the case of Nicaragua).
The United Nations found that, where competition over criminal activities and the control of markets between criminal organisations is high, intentional killings tend to increase. In contrast, the ability of a single criminal group to consolidate criminal activities can lead to a reduction in homicides —this is known as “pax mafiosa”.
The repercussions of organised crime extend beyond economic and social costs by adding layers of complexity to violence and criminal governance structures.
For example, the drug trade in Colombia has historically financed both left-wing guerrilla and right-wing paramilitary groups, bolstering their influence. Paramilitaries, in turn, often provided territorial security to drug cartels. This dynamic not only fuelled corruption and weakened the rule of law but also led to terrorism against civilians and targeted assassinations of public officials to disrupt government anti-drug campaigns, as depicted in Wade Davis’s well known book Magdalena, River of Dreams:
“Both a corridor of commerce and a fountain of culture, the wellspring of Colombian music, literature, poetry and prayer, the Magdalena River has served in dark times as the graveyard of the nation. And yet, always, it returns as a river of life.”
Wade Davis
2. Unresolved social issues
Unresolved social issues remain a significant challenge in many Latin American countries, including the marginalisation of indigenous populations, disputes over land rights, deep-rooted inequalities, and limited access to opportunities—problems that, in some cases, date back to colonial times.
Colombia experienced a period of relative political peace in the early 20th century, but social discontent led to repression and instances of mass violence. A notable event was the 1928 massacre of striking banana workers at the United Fruit Company plantation, which deeply impacted public perception and trust in the state, famously portrayed in Gabriel García Márquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude.
In Central America, large social inequalities and social discontent, amplified by the Cold War and opposition to military dictatorships, created conditions ripe for revolutionary movements and civil wars.
More recently, the COVID-19 pandemic led to an increase in protests and politically driven violence. In Venezuela, protests surged due to worsening economic conditions and concerns over democratic governance (more on this 👇)
3. Civil Wars
Latin America’s history of violence has been shaped by civil wars driven by political and economic divides, conflicts against military regimes, and the radicalisation of political groups.
El Salvador’s civil war (1979–92), triggered by unresolved social grievances, resulted in thousands of deaths. Following the war, the militarisation of social society, the return, weak state presence, and lack of economic prospects led to the rise of pandillas—initially self-defence groups that evolved into criminal organisations involved in extortion and territorial control.
Guatemala’s civil war (1960–96) similarly caused widespread death, severe human rights abuses, the displacement of millions —particularly among indigenous Maya—and institutional weakening.
The Colombian Armed Conflict (1964–present), although not always classified as a traditional civil war, involved prolonged fighting between government forces, guerrilla groups (e.g., ELN, FARC), paramilitaries, and impacted civilians, especially in rural areas.
In Nicaragua, the Revolution (1960s–1990) involved a series of conflicts including the struggle against the Somoza dictatorship, the Sandinista uprising, and the Contra War, driven by social and political upheaval.
4. Dictatorships and state violence
In the 20th century, several countries in the region experienced dictatorships where imprisonment, torture, and enforced disappearances were common.
In recent times, dictators seized power in
Chile, where General Augusto Pinochet seized power after a military coup that ousted President Salvador Allende in 1973. His regime was marked by severe human rights abuses, including torture, forced disappearances, and the suppression of political opposition. Economic reforms were implemented under neoliberal policies, with had mixed outcomes. Pinochet stepped down after losing a national plebiscite in 1988, leading to democratic elections in 1990.
Argentina (1976-1983) where a military junta led by figures such as Jorge Rafael Videla, Leopoldo Galtieri, and others seized power. Known as the “Dirty War”, this period involved state terrorism against perceived dissidents, with tens of thousands of people kidnapped, tortured, or killed. The military junta collapsed after its failure in the Falklands War in 1982 and pressure from human rights organisations, leading to democratic elections in 1983.
24 March 2021 marked the 45th anniversary of the coup that launched Argentina’s most violent period of military rule. From 1976-1983, the dictatorship became notorious for its gross violations of human rights and the economic and social crises it provoked Brazil (1964-1985), with various military presidents, starting with Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco seizing power. The regime suppressed dissent through censorship and violence, while also promoting economic growth through industrialisation projects. Political freedoms were restricted, and human rights abuses were widespread. The military began a gradual transition to democracy in the 1980s, culminating in a civilian government in 1985.
Venezuela is often described as an authoritarian or semi-authoritarian state rather than an outright dictatorship, although some critics label it as such due to its lack of democratic principles. While Hugo Chávez was democratically elected in 1999, his successor Nicolás Maduro has presided over a significant erosion of democratic institutions. He narrowly won the presidency in April 2013 (although the opposition candidate contested the result). His re-election in 2018 was widely criticised as fraudulent, with the Organisation of American States (OAS), the European Union (EU), and countries such as the USA recognising the results of the 2018 election as illegitimate. Ever since that time, the Maduro regime has used repression and human rights abuses to remain in power, culminating with the July 2024 election which he openly stole from the opposition.
Maduro Declares Victory Amidst Allegations of Election Fraud – Venezuela's Political Crisis Deepens
Dictatorships in Latin America have often set the stage for civil wars by creating environments of extreme political polarisation, economic inequality, and social repression.
These authoritarian regimes contributed to civil conflicts in many different ways, all leading to violence:
repression and human rights abuses through systematic use of violence, torture, and suppression of dissent which fostered deep resentment among marginalised populations. Heavy-handed approaches tended to alienate large sectors of society, leading to armed resistance.
the suppression of political opposition, often banning political parties and stifling democratic participation. Suppression forced opposition groups to resort to armed conflict as a means to challenge the regime and advocate for change.
economic inequality and land concentration, often protecting the interests of elite landowners and businesses while failing to address severe economic inequalities and land rights issues. This created fertile ground for revolutionary movements advocating for economic redistribution and social reforms.
the legacy from the Cold War, a period when the USA supported right-wing military dictatorships in Latin America as part of its anti-communist strategy. Such external support emboldened repressive regimes, leading to greater violence against leftist movements. Conversely, the Soviet Union and Cuba often supported revolutionary groups fighting against these dictatorships. The dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet in Chile (1973–1990) was backed by the USA following a coup against the democratically elected socialist President Salvador Allende.
the legacy of armed groups and weak institutions: once dictatorships fell, many countries were left with weakened institutions, poorly integrated military forces, and a lack of mechanisms for political dialogue. These often led to power vacuums that armed groups filled, leading to ongoing violence and, in some cases, civil wars. In Colombia, the militarisation and violence during the mid-20th century under various authoritarian leaders, combined with a weak state presence in rural areas, contributed to the rise of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The conflict that followed lasted for decades, becoming one of the longest civil wars in the region.
catalysing social movements: dictatorships galvanised social movements that transitioned into armed uprisings. When peaceful protests and demands for reform were met with violence, many groups chose to organise armed resistance. The Cuban Revolution, led by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, was initially a response to the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista. The regime’s corruption, repression, and favouring of American business interests over Cuban welfare fuelled the revolutionary fervour that resulted in Batista being overthrown in 1959.
Dictatorships have often set the conditions for civil wars in Latin America by creating environments characterised by severe repression, economic disparity, and exclusion of political alternatives. The combination of social discontent, political suppression, and Cold War dynamics led to the radicalisation of opposition groups and the eruption of armed conflicts in several countries.
These wars have left enduring legacies of violence, weak governance, and social divisions that many Latin American countries continue to grapple with today.
5. Political violence
Related to the above, revolution and armed conflict, rather than politics, have been seen by political parties as the only viable mean to obtain social progress —resulting in political assassinations, crimes, and civil wars.
Colombia witnessed a period often described as ‘La Violencia’ which began with the April 9, 1948 assassination of the leader of the Liberal party, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. His death triggered widespread riots known as El Bogotazo, which led to large-scale destruction in Bogotá and marked the beginning of a period of intense civil conflict between liberal and conservative factions. We can only speculate as to the motives for the killing — the gunman was lynched by an angry mob, and therefore never questioned. According to speculations, powerful political and economic interests might have orchestrated the murder to prevent Gaitán from implementing reforms that would challenge the traditional power structures in the country. That period was also fuelled by long-standing political discontent, leading to severe brutality. While an agreement in 1957 between liberal and conservative parties helped bring this period to an end, it also radicalised groups who then favoured armed conflict over politics as a means for social change, contributing to the rise of guerrilla movements and further conflict.
Why is Latin America so violent? I hear you asked a simple question, but the answer is far from simple.
What do you think are the most important steps governments in Latin America should take to reduce violence? Share your thoughts in the comments below!